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A B S T R A C T
Marine fisheries plays an important role in ensuring food security and providing livelihoods in South Africa, as in
many other developing coastal States. Transnational fisheries crime seriously undermines these goals. Drawing
on empirical research this contribution highlights the complexity of law enforcement at the interface between
low-level poaching and organised crime in the small-scale fisheries sector with reference to a South African case
study. Specifically, this article examines the relationship between a fisheries-crime law enforcement approach
and the envisaged management approach of the South African Small-Scale Fisheries Policy.
1. Introduction
The preceding contributions in this collection have explored the
concept of fisheries crime and its implications from a law enforcement
perspective. These discussions focus primarily on crime within the
commercial fisheries sector. However, criminal offences also take place
within the small-scale fisheries (SSF) sector. With reference to an em-
pirical case study in South Africa, this contribution zooms in on the
implications of such criminality with a fisheries-crime law enforcement
lens. The management of the SSF sector in South Africa is governed by
the Small Scale Fisheries Policy (SSFP) [1], which is rooted in a human-
rights-based paradigm. The interface between this policy and a law
enforcement strategy dealing with crime in the SSF sector is complex
and it is this complexity which is unpacked and analysed in this article
via the use of that case study.
In this paper we use two distinct, yet related, paradigms that have
gained traction in recent years.
The first, highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food (Special Rapporteur) and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for
Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food
Security and Poverty Eradication (Sustainability Guidelines) [2], voices
the need for a shift from a top-down management strategy to a strong
human-rights-based approach to small-scale-fisheries management.
This call comes in response to the failure of the neo-liberal ‘trickle-
down’ approach to management in this sector, via individual transfer-
able quotas (ITQs), to adequately support the realisation of basic
human rights, such as food security and sustainable livelihoods, and,
thereby, effectively contribute towards poverty alleviation [3].1 We
situate this paper within the social inequality and economic exclusion
of small-scale fishers in South Africa mainly due to neo-liberal policies
implemented by government. We use a human-rights-based approach to
argue for social and economic justice in allocating rights in recognition
of the fact that one of the drivers of fisheries crime in the sector is
formal exclusion resulting from the lack of legal harvesting rights.
The second, namely the fisheries crime paradigm, advocates, in
recognition of the inadequacy of the ‘traditional’ legal approach to
address global illegal fishing to date, a law enforcement approach that
recasts illegal fishing potentially as a type of ‘fisheries crime’ and draws
on criminal law enforcement and the procedural tools it offers to ad-
dress the problem.2
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1 The human rights approach to small-scale fisheries is rooted in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa and aims to secure fishers’ rights to livelihoods,
food security and self-governance of marine resources through ‘community-based legal entities’ (defined in the SSFP as ‘a recognised group of fishers from an
identified and declared fishing community, which is a legal entity with perpetual succession, and the holder of a right granted or recognised under this Policy’) and
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managing small-scale fisheries offers, in itself, no panacea. Indeed, care should be taken to ensure that such an approach does not inadvertently facilitate the very
neoliberal agenda it seeks to counter (see Ruddle and Davis [3] at 91.
2 This paradigm has been outlined comprehensively in the introductory essay in this collection written by P Vrancken, E Witbooi and J Glazewski Introduction and
Overview: Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime.
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The complex interface of these two paradigms is aptly illustrated by
reference to the case of South African small-scale fisheries management
in the context of increasing transnational organised crime (TOC) in the
fisheries sector. South Africa, via the Department of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), has indicated, while involved in relevant
international processes,3 its willingness to embrace the fisheries-crime
approach to fisheries law enforcement, and the question arises whether
such an approach is capable of accommodating a human-rights-driven
management approach to the SSF sector, as advocated in the SSFP [1],4
which was developed in partial response to the outcome of the Kenneth
George and Others v the Minister case [4]. It is this question that we
address in this essay. More specifically, what we examine is whether,
and if so how, a fisheries-crime law enforcement approach can com-
plement the SSFP in such a way as to effectively deal with illegal har-
vesting in the domestic SSF sector whilst simultaneously supporting the
realisation of basic human rights, particularly the right of access to food
and sustainable livelihoods. We also focus on a number of key related
issues arising from the research that informs this contribution, in-
cluding: the link between fisheries management and law enforcement at
fishing community level — more specifically, how such a law en-
forcement approach is able to support a management approach that is
rooted in the realisation of basic human rights — and, from a law en-
forcement lens, how one deals with individuals in the fishing commu-
nities who aid organised criminals because they lack alternative live-
lihood options — solutions here cannot be found purely in law
enforcement responses, but must necessarily be rooted in social and
economic government policies and programmes.
The article is structured as follows. After describing the research
methods, it first outlines the theoretical and factual contexts informing
the substance of this article before moving on to unpack from a human-
rights-based lens the ill-fit of the traditional fisheries management and
enforcement models to date in addressing illegal fishing in the SSF
sector with reference to various illustrative case studies. The discussion
deliberately raises a number of critical questions highlighted by em-
pirical research, to which there are no easy answers. The paper moves
on to discuss the fisheries-crime paradigm in relation to the effect of
illegal fishing on and within SSF, with a particular interest in how it
might impact the right of access to food and food security in this sector.
Building on this, it then looks at how the fisheries-crime paradigm
might be used when implementing the SSFP to ensure that illegal
fishing in the South African SSF is handled in such a way as to protect
and promote the human rights of small-scale fishers. The article con-
cludes with some thoughts on how the potential synergy between the
fisheries-crime approach and the small-scale fisheries policy can best be
fostered towards this end.
2. Research methods
Fieldwork for the case studies referred to in this paper was con-
ducted over a period of 10 years within coastal communities in the
Western Cape Province (more specifically, in the Southern Cape re-
gion). The methods used were qualitative in nature and included the
use of participatory observations, key informants, workshops, focus
group interviews with fishers and selected household interviews. The
interviews were with fishers, interim relief permit holders, rights
holders and boat owners. The research also made use of key informants
to assist with arranging interviews and to serve as contacts when not
conducting fieldwork.
The empirical work for the social and political process within the
fisheries policy arena was gleaned through a participatory-action re-
search process in terms of which the researcher (Isaacs) formed part of
the group launching the George class-action case in 2005 [4]. Doctoral
research was used as evidence to support the class-action case and
Isaacs joined as a claimant with a supporting affidavit. Isaacs has been
instrumental in the work of the national task team to draft the SSFP
from 2008 to 2010 and has been actively involved in raising awareness
of the right to livelihoods and food security of South African small-scale
fishers at national, regional and global forums and conferences [5].
3. Illegal fishing in the South Africa small-scale fishing sector
3.1. Management of the small-scale sector
Fish makes a vital contribution to the food and nutritional security
of over 200 million Africans and provides income for over 10 million,
but globally fish stocks are severely over-utilised as highlighted in the
introductory essay in this Special Issue [6].5 Illegal fishing off the
African coast is a major contributory factor to over-exploitation, with
West African waters estimated to have the highest rates of IUU fishing
globally — the estimated illegal catch in the Eastern Central Atlantic is
currently worth between US$828 million and US$1.6 billion annually
[7,8]. As evidenced by the contributions in this compilation, the tra-
ditional approach to addressing illegal fishing (the illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) approach), which focuses on strengthening
conservation and management rules and stepping up compliance of
vessels, has reaped minimal success [9].6 This has arguably been largely
due to a misunderstanding of the problem at hand as being purely a
fisheries management problem as opposed to, at a more fundamental
level, a failure of international fisheries law enforcement [10]. Further,
as exemplified by the management of the SSF sector, this lack of success
is arguably also due to a fundamental ‘misfit’ between the IUU ap-
proach and the challenges of managing the small-scale sector. In the
South African context, abundant empirical evidence— presented in this
paper — attests to this ill-fit, highlighting that the IUU approach is at
odds with the realisation of human rights enshrined in the South
African Constitution — such as equality and human dignity — in the
SSF sector and does not accord with the human rights and develop-
mental approach to fisheries governance advocated by the SSFP. Dif-
fering from the IUU approach, the fisheries crime paradigm, outlined in
preceding contributions in this collection, regards illegal fishing as a
potential form of criminal activity committed within the fisheries
sector, which is best addressed by strategically harnessing criminal-law
tools rather than by treating it as a primarily administrative-law matter.
Whilst the focus of law enforcement within the fisheries crime para-
digm is on the high end of the spectrum, namely, tackling well-fi-
nanced, large-scale transnational organised criminal activities primarily
in the commercial fisheries sector, the approach nonetheless has ra-
mifications for illegal harvesting in the SSF sector. The question of in-
terest is whether the fisheries crime approach is more conducive to
supporting the realisation of human rights in the SSF section than the
IUU approach. We attempt to address this question in this contribution.
At a global level, there is increased emphasis on the important role
of small-scale fisheries in contributing to food security. This is evi-
denced by numerous international instruments and commitments, such
as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
3 These processes are outlined in G Stolsvik's article ‘The development of the
fisheries crime concept and processes to address it in the international arena’ at
XX.
4 It must be emphasised that this article does not engage in a critical analysis
of the SSFP but, rather, engages with the SSFP as the existing domestic policy
for small-scale fisheries and, on that basis, seeks to interrogate how its im-
plementation may interface with the fisheries crime approach.
5 At para 2. Cross-reference to P Vrancken, E Witbooi and J Glazewski
‘Introduction and Overview: Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime’ at XX.
6 As recognised by the FAO at 51- ‘[t]he realities of corruption and organised
crime, which add complexity to the task of combating IUU fishing, need to be
addressed through supplementary means extending beyond the realm of fisheries
control and enforcement’ (Emphasis added).
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Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of National Food
Security (Tenure Guidelines) [11], the FAO Sustainability Guidelines
and the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realisation of the
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (Right
to Food Guidelines) [12]. More specifically, the Special Rapporteur
recognised the link between the right to food and the need for access to
resources such as fish and water [13].7
Domestically, the South African Constitution [14] enshrines the
right of access to sufficient food.8 The SSFP takes this a step further in
the SSF sector by creating opportunities for fishers to participate in a
formalised value chain as part of a development agenda that is con-
cerned with poverty alleviation, food security, access to financial ca-
pital and subsidies. Under the Constitution, the State may make budgets
available through national, provincial and local governments to
strengthen the capacity, training and skills of local community entities
and cooperatives. The ability of the South African authorities to make
small-scale fishers more food-secure and less vulnerable in practice,
however, will depend on the governability of small-scale fisheries, that
is to say the quality of representation of local committees, the nature of
the rights-allocation process and the relationship between industrial
fishing entities and small-scale fishers. As stated by the Special Rap-
porteur, the State is both obliged to protect the right to food by pro-
tecting ‘the access rights of traditional fishing communities from in-
dustrial fishing’ and controlling ‘private actors that could affect the…
territories and water on which these communities depend’ and to fulfil
the right to food by acting proactively to strengthen the individuals’
access to, and use of, fisheries resources and means to ensure their li-
velihoods via, inter alia, ‘improving the incomes of small-scale fishing
communities’[13].9 The role the State has to play towards realising the
right of access to food is thus crucial and must inform the oper-
ationalisation of the SSFP. The question is how this relates to the role of
the State in fisheries law enforcement under the fisheries crime para-
digm.
Empirical research highlights that the challenges faced on a daily
basis by small-scale fishers along the South African coast bear harsh
witness to the need for an alternative approach to that used to manage
the sector until now. In particular, this research not only provides
evidence of the need for an alternative understanding of what con-
stitutes ‘illegal’ fishing in this sector, and how to address it, but also
underscores the imperative of addressing food security and livelihood
concerns.
3.2. Poaching as a form of resistance
This paper does not seek to interrogate the issues of illegality, de-
terrence, compliance, non-compliance or legitimacy in fisheries, which
have been covered by Kuperan and Sutinen [15], Jentoft [16] and
Hauck [17]. Rather, it highlights an important element that we feel is
missing to date, namely, the situation of ‘illegal’ fishing in the ‘infra-
politics’[18]10 of small-scale fishers in South Africa in terms of which
‘poaching [i]s a form of resistance’ [18].11 Our theoretical framework to
contextualise the politics of poaching and how it is used as a tool of
resistance against the Apartheid fisheries policies favouring white
economic domination over other race groups is limited to the works of
Scott [18]. In so doing, we lean heavily on Scott's notions of hidden
transcripts, onstage performance and offstage performance. Scott ar-
gues that members of a subordinate group (in our example, excluded
fishers of colour) construct hidden transcripts as they congregate
offstage, outside official regulatory structures, to speak and act outside
the purview of the elite. Because these private conversations are un-
known (in terms of their existence and content) by the elite law-makers,
subordinates can speak more freely without fearing the consequences of
being overheard. This freedom results in a ‘hidden transcript’ (‘off-stage
discourse’), which is somewhat conspiratorial in nature [18].12 In our
example of South African small-scale fisheries, the ‘hidden transcript’
comprises the framework or basis for actions by fishers with no formal
legal right to fish who operate outside, and at times in conflict with,
formal fishing rules and regulations. The hidden transcript provides a
means for the excluded fishers to covertly express their antagonism
towards the dominant fisheries management and regulatory system and
to strategise their actions, while overtly complying with the manage-
ment system outside of their hidden transcript.
Scott's theory implies that participants of a hidden transcript control
its creation and termination, its content and its dispersal. In other
words, without the participants’ hidden discourse, transcripts fail to
exist. In addition, participants own the content and nature of their
hidden transcripts: they are agents of and over the hidden discourse.
This means that subordinates cannot openly observe, nor directly in-
fluence, the hidden transcript of the elite and vice versa. Each group's
offstage transcript cannot overlap with that of another group. In fact,
‘[t]he hidden transcripts of dominant and subordinate are, in most
circumstances, never in direct contact’ [18].13 Interactions between
members of opposing groups usually occur only in the public domain
(that is, onstage). Evidence of this, in the case of SSF in South Africa,
can be found in challenges to policies and quotas concerning the small-
scale sector as well as clashes (sometimes violent) between illegal
small-scale harvesters and law enforcement officers. Scott criticises the
‘examination of public action in power-laden situations that overlooks
both the “hidden transcripts” and the necessity of routine and prag-
matic submission to the “compulsion of economic relations” as well as
the realities of coercion’[19].14 Fishers witness daily the involvement of
police and fisheries officials in abalone poaching and remain silent in
public as they fear punishment, brutality, arrests and imprisonment by
the police. Fishers only speak about such involvement in the safe spaces
of their hidden transcripts.
Scott's concepts of onstage and offstage performances help us to
understand why the poor exercise their acts of defiance in the formal
fishing rights application process. His work on hidden transcripts assists
in understanding the marginalised poor fishers’ acts of defiance as
agency from below. For example, marginalised poor fishers may show
their discontent in the fishing rights allocation system through either
publicly protesting or via poaching.
Scott reminds us that, if fisheries departments want marginalised
poor fishers to accept the rights allocation process, they need to show
that they not only recognise this group in policies [20,21],15 but also
allocate fishing quotas to those fishers. The marginalised poor fishers
can use the onstage and offstage arenas of this action space, through
explicit and disguised forms of resistance, to exercise their agency from
below. They will decide whether to act in such a way as to legitimise
the new direction of the rights allocation process or show their dis-
approval through poaching.
Poaching may thus be seen as one form of weapon or tool used by
fishers who have tried to go the legal route, but who have lost out, and
engage in a form of more direct resistance, ‘a routine form of everyday
7 Paras 39 and 40 where reference is made in fn 51 to the George case [13] fn
3.
8 See s 27(1)(b).
9 At paras 40 and 41.
10 J.C. Scott [18] at 156 ‘infrapolitics’ refers to invisible resentment.
11 J.C. Scott [18] at 156.
12 J.C. Scott [18] at 4.
13 J.C. Scott [18] at 15.
14 J.C. Scott [19] at 16.
15 As has been done via the Small-scale Fisheries Policy [20,21] fn 1 and the
2014 Marine Living Resources Amendment Act, which amends the 1998 Marine
Living Resources Act by expanding the definition of ‘small-scale fisher’ (s 1 (a))
and making provision for measures relating to small-scale fishing and for the
powers and duties of the Minister in this regard (s 5 which substitutes s 19 of
the 1998 MRLA).
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resistance’ which questions the legitimacy of the new allocation process
[16,18,19,22,23]. This is not to say that all fishers who poach are en-
gaging in resistance as there is a large group of professional poachers
who never intend to take the legal route. In addition, large-scale
poaching of West Coast rock lobster and abalone also takes place in
contexts where there is high unemployment and where criminal gangs
are involved. It is thus important to distinguish between different ca-
tegories of violators, although of course the boundaries are porous and
there is overlap. It is useful here to refer back to the compliance pyr-
amid referred to in the introductory essay in this compilation: whilst
the majority of illegal harvesting in small-scale fisheries can be located
as impacting the local sphere exclusively and is most likely undertaken
by those classified as ‘opportunists’ in terms of the pyramid — to be
matched with a compliance strategy of ‘deterrence’ and suited to ad-
ministrative law sanctions —, there is a small category of illegal fishers
in this sector that fall within the organised, deliberate law-breaker ca-
tegory with yet an even smaller group operating or interacting with
those who operate in the transnational domain. Illegal fishers within
this latter group, regardless of whether they are small-scale or com-
mercial, are regarded as criminals and the suitable compliance strategy
is deemed to be intelligence-led policing with a view to prosecution
using whatever legal tools are available. Particularly tricky, however, is
illegal harvesting in the high-value small-scale resources sphere, eg
abalone and West Coast rock lobster, where there is a hazy cross-over
line between resistance poachers and ‘professional’ poachers, non-or-
ganised/organised illegal harvesting and domestic/transnational op-
erations. It is in this multi-layered sphere that the interface between the
fisheries crime law enforcement strategy and the implementation of the
SSFP is most stark and, in practice, likely to be the most challenging.
In South Africa, the public protest process that culminated in the
George case [4] and resulted in the SSFP, the amendments to the MLRA
as well as the SSF implementation plan, was the driver of positive
changes in the legislative landscape and cemented formal recognition of
this sector. However, in order for the new policy and effective man-
agement of the inshore resources to be successfully implemented,
compliance by those who have been fishing illegally as an act of defi-
ance is going to be key. To ensure compliance, the SSFP envisages
primarily community monitoring of the resources in question through a
co-management16 representative body. The feasibility of this, particu-
larly in the context of high-value small-scale resources, however, is
unclear.
Wilson states that formal and informal institutions are always
changing [24,25]. Even when such changes are not dramatic shifts in
written laws and basic organisational structures, marginal changes are
happening through evolving interpretations and shifting degrees of
compliance. These constant changes are produced by competitive pro-
cesses in which different groups seek to push institutions in the direc-
tions they desire. This is supported by Leach et al., who point out that
‘[s]ocial actors alter their behavior to new social, political and ecolo-
gical circumstances’, hence ‘institutional flexibility and dynamism are
essential.’[26] The authors also warn, however, that, whilst some in-
stitutions claim to promote collective good, they reproduce exclusion
and marginalisation of certain actors. Institutions are thus shaped by
politics and power.
Returning to South Africa, the empirical studies described below
indicate the presence of a criminal element in the illegal fishing oc-
curring in the abalone and West Coast rock lobster sectors. This is in-
timately linked at local community level with gang activities.
Interviews suggest that illegal trade of high-value species in
contravention of the regulations will continue beyond the achievement
of legitimacy of the policy and the process of rights allocation to small-
scale fishers. This was aptly illustrated by recent research, in the con-
text of interim relief allocations in the 2013/2014 season, in terms of
which a coastal fishing community had identified all the bona fide
fishers that should benefit from the interim rights. The list of such
fisheries that had been drawn up was given to a gang leader for ‘ap-
proval’, who subsequently set about replacing the bona fide fishers with
members of his gang [27–29]. This highlights the inherent difficulties
associated with empowering communities to self-regulate management
of, in particular, high-value coastal resources. A further important
challenge is the fact that it is difficult to exclude criminal elements in
the community from access to, and the management of, the resources
when some of them play a crucial social welfare role in the community
by, for example, providing cash advances for food and paying the
school fees of children. Furthermore, many members of the community
are simply too afraid to identify and challenge the criminal element
within the community [29–31].17
In view of the above, what role does a law enforcement approach
envisage for fishing communities when it comes to distinguishing be-
tween low-level illegal harvesting versus persistent organised illegal
fishing associated with transnational criminal networks? To put it
bluntly: whose ‘job’ will it be to draw the line: the community mana-
ging the resource in question or the law enforcement officers (that is,
the fisheries control officers and/or police)? The research highlighted in
this essay warns against placing the burden on the community. This is
because the line is in practice a murky boundary and the point at which
these two ‘sides’ (community management and law enforcement) merge
is somewhere within the context of activities conducted by gangs that
are firmly entrenched within the communities in question. The likely
practical difficulty that will arise is that the community will struggle to
sustainably manage the resources in question as long as elements of
organised poaching persist because individuals within the community
are unlikely to ‘inform’ on the poachers, thereby frustrating potential
investigative inroads into the organised networks and weakening the
ability to pursue and bring to book the masterminds behind the trans-
national operations. The scenario is further complicated by the fact that
research reveals that a number of law enforcement officers are them-
selves known to be involved in the poaching of abalone and West Coast
rock lobster [28,29] and one can hardly expect the community to police
‘the police’ and gangs. Finding appropriate answers to these questions
and solutions from within the ambit of the community jurisdiction is
key in order not to compromise both the sustainability of the resources
in question and food security, given that the species function in many
communities as ‘fish for cash’ to purchase and pay for daily necessities.
3.3. Empirical examples
3.3.1. Empirical case 1: Abalone, Arniston
Fishing in Arniston can be traced to the first nations KhoiSan
through the use of vyfers (fish traps) in the intertidal zone. Species such
as elf (Pomatomus saltatrix), harder (Liza richardsonii), kolstert (Diplodus
sargus capensis), strepie (Sarpa salpa) and galjoen (Dichistius capensis)
were caught in these traps. The traps were maintained by clans and
families, and women would harvest, gut, cut and cook the fish [32].
Communities situated along the Southern Cape coast of South Africa
were selected for this study. The selection was based on their small-
scale fishing activities, the low-technology gear utilised, the species
targeted, their dependency on marine resources, their poverty and
unemployment levels as well as the fact that they reside next to or
within a marine protected area. Fish in these communities have
16 As noted below co-management is not an approach without criticism. This
article does not delve into these criticisms, neither does it seek to necessarily
support such an approach. Instead, reference to co-management is rooted in the
context of discussing it as an element of the existing South African policy re-
garding management of small-scale fisheries, namely, the SSFP [1].
17 At 422, 243 regarding the the issue of fear amongst the community of re-
porting poachers although in this instance it is not gangs that are the fear-
inducing factor.
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traditionally been harvested for sale and subsistence. However, from
the time the waters adjacent to these communities were declared
marine protected area their livelihoods have been negatively impacted
and this has led to an increase in poaching. One of the fishers explained
that ‘[w]e poach during the night and day. Spring tide, during full moon
is the best time to go for abalone as we are able to see. We take
whatever we see. We do not have any other options, no fishing rights
and no restricted areas to fish. We know it is illegal, but we are
struggling to survive’.
According to the fishers, the poaching of abalone is becoming highly
problematic, especially as far as the younger men who are unemployed
are concerned. Fishers blame the rights-allocation process, the no-take
zone in the MPA, the lack of livelihood opportunities and the access to
quick and easy money for the younger generation for the unmanageable
state of poaching.
All the leaders in the community agree that the poaching activities
are beyond their control. To add fuel to the fire, DAFF allocated, for the
2014/15 and 2015/16 West Coast rock lobster seasons, 49 interim relief
permits to non-active fishers with no history in fishing activity in
Arniston, Struisbaai and Pearly Beach. The list of original fishers was
removed and, according to a local community-based organisation
(Masifundise18 and Coastal Links 19), those fishers fear that they will be
left out of a flawed and highly irregular interim relief allocation system.
‘That will have a devastating effect on the lives of these fishers and
could mean a continuation of outright violation of their human
rights’[33].
3.3.2. Empirical case 2: West Coast Rock Lobster, Ocean View
In Cape Town, one of the most unequal towns in the world with the
significant gap between rich and poor [29,34], there is a high demand
by wealthy locals for West Coast rock lobster (Jasus lalandii), especially
for religious celebrations (Eid and Christmas), New Year celebrations,
weddings and dinner parties [35]. The fishery was regulated to promote
exports by the Crawfish Export Act, 1940 [36]. Over the next 60 years,
a substantial local market has grown but was often ignored by the
authorities. Although the resource declined in the 1960s and 1970s,
informal and unregulated trade increased, probably because the eco-
nomic alternatives on the West Coast were limited [37]. Opportunities
to supply the local and export markets were taken up by informal
fishers who had few other livelihood options [37]. This trade was
spurred by a strong local demand for lobster by the catering industry,
restaurants and wine farms, which provided an ongoing market for
fishers who relied on the informal fishery to contribute to their
households' income. West Coast rock lobster is an important source of
cash for many fishing families, particularly in the Ocean View area.
However, the fact that the resource is harvested illegally has a negative
impact on the future sustainability and governability of the West Coast
rock lobster fishery.
4. The misfit between the IUU approach and small-scale fisheries
The empirical observations highlighted above speak to the misfit
between the past approach to fisheries management and the SSF sector
in South Africa [38–42].20 As is evident, the issue of legality (or not) of
fishing activities runs as a thread throughout the expressions of dis-
content with the way the sector has been administered. Given that the
management approach used to date has not adequately dealt with il-
legality in the sector, it is important to determine, if the fisheries crime
approach is to be looked to as an alternative, when illegal fishing does
transition from being a fisheries management issue to becoming a
criminal law issue.
The management of the SSF sector is tied to its legislative regulation
(or the lack thereof in the past). Prior to 1998, almost all ‘subsistence’
fishing was unregulated and thus regarded as taking place outside the
law. Under the fisheries management approach employed at the time,
this ‘unregulated’ fishing thus placed subsistence fishing into the cate-
gory of ‘IUU’ fishing [10].21 The seeds for the legal recognition of
subsistence fishers and the regulation of subsisting fishing were sown in
the enactment in 1994 of the interim South African Constitution [43],
which fundamentally altered the legal landscape of the country by in-
troducing, for the first time in the country's history, a human-rights-
based dispensation in terms of which all government actions are to be
formulated in terms of, and measured against, the rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights. The right to equality, in particular, was a strong
driver of reform in the fisheries sector, underpinning as it did the
‘foundational’ [44,45]22 transformation objective of the MLRA to re-
medy past discrimination in the fishing industry, [46]23 namely to
‘restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to
achieve equity within all branches of the fishing industry’ [20].24 As
emphasised by the Constitutional Court [44],25 this objective is re-
inforced by the obligation placed on the Minister to have regard to the
need to permit new entrants into the industry ‘particularly those from
historically disadvantaged sectors of society’[20].26
Transformation has, however, been challenging in all the fisheries
sectors, in particular because it is necessary to find an equilibrium
between, on the one hand, effecting transformation in the context of
access rights and, on the other, securing biological sustainability and
broader economic stability, nowhere more so than in the subsistence
sector [38,40,47]. The MLRA provided legal recognition to a domestic
‘subsistence’ fishing sector for the first time in South Africa's legislative
history via dedicated MLRA provisions in section 19 [20]. This was
arguably intended as proof of the government's transformative intent.
Yet, movement beyond theoretical intent towards the concrete
achievement of the transformation goals in the sector has proven
frustratingly slow and difficult. Fisheries law enforcement under the
MLRA remained initially steeped in the traditional IUU fisheries man-
agement approach. This is reflected in the fact that the government's
response to fishing in violation of the MLRA provisions was to con-
sistently tighten management measures and step up compliance and
enforcement efforts. This was exemplified in the abalone sector, where,
despite evidence of an infiltration of organised crime elements in illegal
abalone poaching from the 1990s onwards, law enforcement efforts
remained firmly based in a fisheries management approach. That re-
sponse was typified by case-by-case inspections favoured over in-
telligence-led investigations which, combined with lack of community
buy-in, associated inter alia with discriminatory legal harvesting rights
under the former Apartheid regime, resulted in minimal success in
halting abalone poaching [39,48].
18 Masifundise a social justice fisheries Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO) has mobilised and organised fishing communities since 2004. A key goal
was to build locally based governance structures to fully participate in political
and economic decision making processes.
19 Masifundise established Coastal Links (CL) in 2007 as the community based
organisation for small-scale fisheries in the Western and Northern Cape pro-
vinces of South Africa. In 2010 it set up structures in the Eastern Cape and
Kwazulu Natal and after 2 years it established a National Executive Committee.
In 2015, CL had 2000 members in 89 coastal towns and became the first na-
tional body representing small-scale fishers.
20 Discussions around the complexity of illegality in the South African SSF
(footnote continued)
sector have been captured in literature including that referenced.
21 The ill-fit between the IUU approach and small-scale fisheries management
is expressly highlighted, noting at 209 that the former brands ‘small-scale or
artisanal fishing in waters where no fisheries management system is in place
and thus no access control operates’ as IUU fishing.
22 At paras 78, 81.
23 At para 26.
24 Section 2 (j).
25 At para 96.
26 Section 18(5).
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An apt example of such failed law enforcement efforts in the past
can be found with reference to the abalone sector where poaching as
‘protest fishing’ has taken place over many years. ‘Protest fishing’, un-
derstood in the context of fishing as a form of resistance, as outlined
above in Section 3.2, entails traditional fishers openly ‘poaching’ as a
means of protesting against the government's failure to grant legal
rights to the fishery. To address that problem, it has been argued that
broadening access to the abalone fishery would ‘legalise’ the fishers’
activities and recognise them as lawful fishers rather than ‘criminals’
[50]. The solution advocated involved decriminalising the activities of
informal fishers through the allocation of abalone fishing rights. This
entailed, more specifically, the implementation of a territorial user
rights system complemented by a co-management arrangement be-
tween rights holders and the fisheries department. Instead, however,
various law enforcement initiatives have been introduced over the
years to target abalone poachers [51].27
All of these initiatives were ultimately regarded as failures, how-
ever, because they proved inadequate in the face of the growing illicit
trade and the emerging corruption between law enforcement officers
who ‘turn[ed] a blind eye’ [51]. The need for re-thinking around allo-
cation rights to abalone thus became ever-increasingly pressing.
In 2005, an Equality Court application by the Artisanal Fishers
Association, Masifundise, and the Legal Resources Centre, with support
from academics, was lodged against the Minister of the (then)
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) [4,52].28
Citing violations of constitutional rights and the Promotion of Equality
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act [53], the applicants ar-
ticulately highlighted the utter failure of the MLRA reform process
(individual transferable quota-based system for allocation of fishing
rights) in the subsistence sector to date in light of its adverse social and
economic impacts. On that basis, they demanded governmental action
to redress the alleged violation of fishers’ fundamental human rights
[4].29 The resultant obligation of the Minister, stemming from a set-
tlement of that litigation in 2007 — subsequently made an order of the
Equality Court — was to craft a new policy adequately catering for
equitable access to coastal resources for traditional fishers. This cul-
minated in the release of the SSFP in 2012 and an amendment to the
MLRA in 2014 that specifically incorporates small-scale fishers as a
legally recognised sector entitled to the allocation of fishing rights in
line with the SSPF [20,21].30 Despite these legislative and policy
developments, however, the majority of small-scale fishers still do not
hold legal access rights and thus continue to fish ‘illegally’. In practice,
they therefore remain within the catchment ambit of the IUU concept.
Indeed, the mainstream ITQ neoliberal fisheries rights allocation
system (FRAP) is continuing and promises that the inshore resources
would form part of the small-scale fisheries allocation remain un-
fulfilled. The apportionment of fishing rights continues to favour in-
dividual rights rather than an allocation of a ‘bundle’ or ‘basket’ of
rights to SSF communities to harvest coastal resources. All the linefish
permits are allocated to individual rights holders and, whilst there is a
promise that all abalone will be allocated to small-scale fishers, with the
‘basket’ of rights continually being diminished by the fisheries depart-
ment, it is becoming increasingly clear that the department is paying lip
service to promoting fishers’ rights to livelihood and food security. The
lack of political will to implement real change in the fisheries rights
allocation system seems set to risk the sustainability of the resources
and fuel continued illegal fishing in the small-scale sector.
Why is this so despite the provisions of the SSFP that seek to move
towards the fulfilment of constitutional rights including the right to
food? The answer is arguably related to the current failure of the State
to play the necessary proactive role in both protecting and fulfilling
these rights. As asserted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, ‘The fisheries sector can contribute to the realisation of the right
to food by providing employment and income and sustaining local
economies’ [13].31 Policy responses grounded in the right to food will
facilitate this yet, as the UN Special Rapporteur is quick to caution, the
right to food will not provide a master plan to fisheries reform in this
regard: context matters [13].32 The human rights obligation of states
must guide their actions and the courts should play the role of keeping
them on track. Referencing the South African Equality Court case, the
Rapporteur emphasised that ‘[c]ourts should be empowered, in parti-
cular, to adjudicate claims from small-scale fishers whose livelihoods
are threatened by measures that infringe on their ability to fish so as to
provide sufficient income to ensure an adequate standard of
living’[13].33 The role of the government in operationalising the SSFP
towards realising the human rights of small-scale fishers, along with the
associated challenges, is discussed later in greater detail in Section 6 in
the context of analysing the SSFP.
5. The fisheries crime law enforcement approach and small-scale
fisheries
As emphasised in earlier articles in this Special Issue, fisheries is a
well-structured highly lucrative international business [54] and, whilst
much of the activities carried out by fishing organisations in the sector
are legitimate [10,55], evidence points to the fact that many are asso-
ciated with illegal activities along the value chain. ‘The issue of where
the illicit markets merge with the licit is a grey area, as is the range of
actors that sit largely in legitimate industries that facilitate the trade
and its onward passage. These are the intermediaries within the illicit
27 The most important of these included: Operation Neptune, which was in-
itiated by the fisheries department in 1999 comprising a co-operative policing
venture with the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the navy to address
abalone poaching; Operation Trident, an ‘Abalone Protection Plan’ that focused
on law enforcement strategies including support to the MARINEs; Overstrand
MARINEs, comprising a partnership with the local municipality to institute a
24 h shift watch to deter divers from entering the water in the Overstrand re-
gion; delegation of authority to Table Mountain National Parks to take over the
responsibility of compliance in MPAs; Environmental Courts, established in
2003 as a co-funded initiative by the (then) Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and the Department of Justice, created primarily to
target abalone-related offences; and Collaboration with the Navy, air force, the
Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Unit and Directorate Special
Operations (Scorpions) to gather intelligence on abalone poaching.
28 Note that the referral to the Equality court was appealed.
29 At paras 14, 15.
30 See s 19 of the MLRA as substituted by s 5 of the Marine Living Resources
Amendment Act, 2014. Section 1 of the latter also inserted into s 1 of the MLRA
a definition of the term ‘small-scale fisher’, which is stated to mean ‘a member
of a small-scale fishing community engaged in fishing to meet food and basic
livelihood needs, or directly involved in processing or marketing of fish, who
(a) traditionally operate in near-shore fishing grounds; (b) predominantly em-
ploy traditional low technology or passive fishing gear; (c) undertake single day
fishing trips; and (d) is engaged in consumption, barter or sale of fish or
otherwise involved in commercial activity, all within the small-scale fisheries
sector”. This definition is in line with the universally accepted FAO broad
(footnote continued)
definition of the terms ‘small-scale fisheries’ and ‘artisanal fisheries’. The latter
is defined in the FAO Glossary as meaning ‘traditional fisheries involving
fishing households (as opposed to commercial companies), using relatively
small amount of capital and energy, relatively small fishing vessels (if any),
making short fishing trips, close to shore, mainly for local consumption. In
practice, definition varies between countries, e.g. from gleaning or a one-man
canoe in poor developing countries, to more than 20-m. trawlers, seiners, or
long-liners in developed ones. Artisanal fisheries can be subsistence or com-
mercial fisheries, providing for local consumption or export. They are some-
times referred to as small-scale fisheries’ (http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/
14753/en Accessed 17 September 2018).
31 At para 6.
32 At para 38.
33 At para 39.
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markets’ [56]. From a criminal law enforcement perspective, the fish-
eries crime approach focuses primarily on activities at the top end of the
spectrum and has as its broader goal addressing international organised
crime concerns. Nevertheless, if it is to be accepted as an alternative
paradigm to the often ineffective IUU approach, its application must be
understood in the context of all forms of illegal fishing activities found
along the spectrum. In the context of the subject-matter of this article,
this necessitates unpacking the practical compliance and law enforce-
ment implications of the fisheries crime approach in relation to illegal
fishing (or ‘poaching’) in the SSF sector, as presented above.
The MLRA criminalises almost all transgressions of its provisions
and its regulations. Thus, fisheries law enforcement officers (primarily
fisheries control officers (FCOs)) take the first step in the process of
potentially investigating and pursuing criminal prosecution of those
engaged in illegal fishing activities. It is vital that individual FCOs are
aware of the need to distinguish between fishing community members
involved in low-level illegal harvesting versus individuals deliberately
engaging in fisheries crime. Each FCO requires the necessary skills to
ascertain during an inspection whether the illegal fishing activity under
scrutiny is likely linked to broader organised criminal activity. If it is
linked, the matter should be flagged as worthy of further investigation,
in which case the focus should move from the individual perpetrator, in
her or his capacity as the particular rule-violator, to the broader
criminal context in which she or he is operating. Emphasis should be on
gathering information from this individual towards investigating and
identifying individuals higher up the organised criminal network. It is
at this stage that cooperation with the police is crucial. This approach
has the effect that ‘small-fry’ illegal fishers are not ‘unfairly’ branded as
falling in the same category as criminals engaged in organised crime
and punished as such. It also facilitates the process of weeding out and
flagging those illegal fishing activities that warrant further investiga-
tion because they might provide inroads to major transnational crim-
inal networks with a view to identifying and bringing to book key in-
dividuals within these organisations. Indeed, ‘[i]dentifying the key
individuals within criminal networks, even at a local level, is an es-
sential step to directing resources efficiently and ensuring that they are
not exhausted on ‘lesser’ offenders’ [56].34 By not doing so, one runs the
risk of ‘[t]he war… being waged at the wrong level … relentlessly
pursuing the “army of ants” — the individual poachers, transporters,
corrupt customs officials …’[56]35 Referring back to empirical research
highlight above, there are, however, significant practical challenges in
operationalising this approach around, for example obtaining in-
formation, particularly with regard to high-value resources in the SSF
sector.
One of the key advantages of recasting illegal fishing as fisheries
crime is that it facilitates harnessing criminal law and procedure tools
which are unavailable under a fisheries management approach. One of
the most valuable means of doing so is via enhanced cross-border co-
operation around information and intelligence-sharing and analysis
which contributes significantly towards identifying organised criminal
elements involved in illegal fishing.36 Combined with appropriately
trained personnel, this will go a long way towards ensuring effective
law enforcement and sanctioning of fisheries crime. It will also impact
on the realisation of basic human rights in the context of fisheries
management. Indeed, improved law enforcement around organised
fisheries crime networks makes inroads into halting the adverse effects
of crime, which range from the depletion of natural resources and the
destruction of the surrounding environment, to undermining coastal
States’ economies via lost revenue and tax evasion, threatening States’
security and impacting negatively on food security and coastal liveli-
hoods. [55] ‘At a local level the involvement of elements of organised
crime threatens communities and reduces opportunities to access sus-
tainable and honest income as crime crowds out legitimate ways of
making a living’ [55].37 The Global Initiative against Transnational
Organised Crime's 2014 report on organised environmental crime,
under which fisheries is subsumed, emphasises that human rights
abuses and environmental crime often go hand in hand [55].38
The relevant international legal framework for addressing TOC is
premised on the recognition of the adverse social and economic impacts
of organised crime and is aimed at the protection of the basic human
right to live in dignity, free from hunger and violence, oppression and
injustice [57]. Because fisheries crime is a relatively new legal concept,
it is not expressly covered by UNTOC nor its protocols, but there is no
reason to assume that it is excluded from the Convention's ambit. Ad-
ditionally, various types of organised criminal activity that can poten-
tially take place within the fisheries sector are explicitly covered, in-
cluding human trafficking, corruption and money laundering. As
outlined in an earlier contribution,39 the United Nations expressly re-
cognised the complex, intricate links between organised crime and
criminal activities in the fisheries sector in its comprehensive 2011
UNODC report on TOC in the fishing industry, which highlighted the
vulnerability of the fisheries sector to multiple crimes and provided
evidence of human rights abuses in the sector, in particular human
trafficking and, sometimes, murder [55,56,58,59]. The report's findings
were endorsed by Resolution 20/5 of the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) [60]. The relevance of inter-
national human rights law to states’ initiatives in addressing TOC at sea
was also highlighted by UNODC in its subsequent issue paper on the
topic [61].
5.1. UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD: extracts
‘Fisheries contribute to food security through two pathways: di-
rectly, by providing fish for people, especially low-income consumers,
to eat, thereby improving both food availability and the adequacy of
diets; and indirectly, by generating income from the fisheries sector’
[13].40
‘…the Special Rapporteur does not suggest that the right to food will
provide a master plan for fisheries reform: context matters. The human
rights obligations of States must guide their actions, however…’ [13]41
‘Only by linking fisheries management to the broader improvement
of the economic and social rights of fishers, in a multisectoral approach
that acknowledges how fishing fits into the broader social and eco-
nomic fabric, can progress be made towards robust and sustainable
solutions’. [13] 42
‘States should discharge their duties to respect, protect and fulfil the
right to food in the fisheries sector by moving towards sustainable re-
source use while ensuring that the rights and livelihoods of small-scale
fishers and coastal communities are respected and that the food security
of all groups depending on fish is improved.’[13]43
34 At 23.
35 At 23.
36 Here INTERPOL can play a role together with mutual legal assistance
agreements and tax information exchange treaties. The key role of cooperation
is discussed in G Stølsvik's essay ‘The development of the fisheries crime con-




39 See G Stølsvik ‘The development of the fisheries crime concept and pro-
cesses to address it in the international arena’ at XX.
40 At para 3.
41 At para 38.
42 At para 59.
43 At para 60 and onwards.
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6. The Small-scale Fisheries Policy: human rights centred
South Africa's SSFP heralds a distinct paradigm shift in the man-
agement of the SSF sector. It is rooted in a human rights discourse and
advocates a movement away from from traditional ITQs to a collective
rights system of allocation in terms of which rights are allocated to a
community-based legal entity in line with the amended MLRA defini-
tion of 'small-scale fishers'. Further, fishers and fishing communities are
tasked with co-managing the allocated marine resources together with
the Fisheries Department at the various administrative levels — local,
district and national. This approach reflects the global realisation that
small-scale fisheries play a critical role in the provision of income, jobs
and food for coastal communities. Domestically, the sector is the big-
gest in terms of participants and landed catch and can thus make a
significant contribution towards the socio-economic development of
fishing communities. The key principles and objectives of the policy
include, amongst others, the contribution of the sector towards poverty
alleviation, food security and socio-economic development for the
formerly marginalised coastal communities. The policy further aims to
remedy and rectify the past injustices against coastal and traditional
fishing communities through security of fishing rights and the equitable
distribution of rights to marine resources within the limits of sustain-
able utilisation.
6.1. Kenneth george and others vs the minister and the emergence of the
SSFP
The impetus for the development of the SSFP, arising from the un-
satisfactory fisheries reforms of post-1994 democracy, was the case of
Kenneth George and Others vs the Minister [4]. The main argument of the
case against the Minister was rooted in a human rights approach fo-
cusing specifically on three core rights: the right to equality, the right to
a livelihood and the right of access to food. These rights are protected in
the 1996 South African Constitution. Specifically, the claimants chal-
lenged the transformatory management framework based on the ITQ
system, which favoured big companies, black economic empowerment
— meant to achieve race and gender equity — and rights-grabbers —
local elites — in fishing communities. The claimants sought and pro-
posed: a paradigm shift from ITQs to a collective rights allocation; the
creation of legal entities; a multi-species rights approach; and pre-
ferential access to inshore species for small-scale fishers. The case was
due to be heard in the Equality Court44 but, in May 2007, an agreement
was reached in terms of which the Minister was required to develop a
policy addressing the needs of small-scale fishers and, until such time as
the policy was finalised, to provide ‘interim relief’ (IR) through access
to marine resources. It was further recognised, as part of the agreement,
that the small-scale fishers have a claim to marine resources based on
their traditional practices and livelihoods and, therefore, have special
needs in terms of fisheries management and development. In addition,
they could not be expected to compete with the established fishing
companies for commercial fishing rights [28,38,49,51,62]. Subse-
quently the Fisheries Department convened an SSF summit and a na-
tional task team, comprising fisher representatives, government offi-
cials, NGOs (Masifundise and Coastal Links) and researchers, was
established to develop a new SSFP. The process, which was participa-
tory and took cognisance of the voices and inputs of fishers, culminated
in 2012 in the adoption of the SSFP.
The language of the SSFP, ie. the human rights principles, are
couched in an ‘awkward embrace’ with the neoliberal agenda (see
Ruddle and Davis [3], Li [63] and de Toit [64]). Li [63] reminds us that,
with regard to policies framed within a neoliberal agenda, the winners
and losers do not emerge naturally but, rather, are selected and the
result is the production of an extremely rich social class beside a poorer
class.
In a recent roundtable meeting, [65] Prof Merle Sowman raised her
concerns on the key shifts in DAFF's approach to the verification and
registration of fishers, which resulted in many conflicts mainly due to
unintended consequences of the IR permits (including that the value
chain was captured by the marketers and the industry and that the
process had split fisher organisations) and the fact that little to no at-
tention was given to organising fishers at the local community level
from 2007 to 2018. Clearly, the IR system is situated in the ITQ system
and the associated community moral decay, conflicts and elite-cap-
turing associated with the problematic registration and verification
processes. The IR process turned out to be cumbersome, strict, tech-
nical, bureaucratic and to exclude many fishers, yet again. The appeals
process proved even more difficult and no allowance was made for late
registration.45
7. Synergy between the implementation of the Small-scale
Fisheries Policy and the fisheries crime approach
As outlined above, the approach to managing illegal fishing in
coastal communities, where small-scale fishing dominates, has, until
now, been strongly rooted in the IUU paradigm and proved to be ill-
suited to achieving its goal. Arguably one of the key reasons for its
inappropriateness in the SSF sector is that it leaves no room for re-
cognising that illegal fishing in this sector spans a broad spectrum of
illegal fishing activities ranging from resistance poaching, at the one
end, to — in sharp contrast — large-scale, transnational organised
criminal activity at the other, with the complex interface between the
two occupied by ‘middlemen’.[29] The case of abalone poaching is an
apt case in point here.
Hauck and Sweijd already alluded to the existence of this spectrum
of illegal fishing activities in the context of abalone poaching back in
1999. Their analysis of abalone poaching in the Hawston area deli-
neated two distinct, yet overlapping, groups of illegal harvesters: local
low-key poachers, whose actions were fuelled by complex socio-eco-
nomic and political reasons drivers, and organised criminal syndicates,
driven by the pursuit of massive profits resulting from the high demand
for abalone in the East. The latter's operations infiltrated those of the
former, in many instances absorbing local poachers into their fold in the
process. [66] Taking cognisance of this, the authors recommended an
integrated, two-prong enforcement approach, the one aspect involving
tackling the organised crime facet and the other consisting in ‘focusing
on community involvement in crime prevention, enforcement, aware-
ness, resource ownership, resource management, and local governance’.
[66]46 They specified that the former aspect entailed focusing on in-
telligence, policing, border control and the identification of money-
laundering trails used by syndicates supplying the demand in abalone
markets. They also insisted that addressing local low-key poaching, on
the other hand, should not be via ‘confrontational crime-control
methods’ within the affected communities which, in their view, fre-
quently exacerbated the poaching. Instead, the authors promoted the
use of community-based strategies encouraging shared management
responsibilities [66].47 This ‘co-management’ approach has gained
44 The Equality Court refers to a sitting of the High Court of South Africa that
hears matters argued in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act [53] which gives effect to the equality clause (section
9(1)) of the Constitution.
45 The case of the fisherwoman Fatiema ‘Poppie’ Kok is a case in point where
the system excluded her appeal due to a technicality. See the documentary
testimony of a fisherwoman's struggles with the registration and verification of
the new SSFP and the emotional account of her disappointment at being ex-
cluded for missing a deadline (https://web.facebook.com/FisherwomanSA/?
ref=nf&_rdc=1&_rdr
accessed 17 September 2018).
46 At 1030.
47 M. Hauck and N.A Sweijd [66] at 1030.
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increasing popularity over the years as a (partial) solution to the sus-
tainable management of subsistence and SSF and is now a key principle
of the SSFP. [40]48 The important point made by Hauck and Sweijd was
that both approaches should be pursued in parallel in order to mean-
ingfully address the illegal harvesting in the sector. They wisely pro-
phesised that:
‘poaching and the illegal trade of marine products will not be di-
minished through a single approach. In fact, the very structure of
these activities, which range from local abalone divers to interna-
tional syndicates, emphasises the importance of developing dif-
ferent, but integrated, methods of intervention. Not only do new
approaches need to be considered for the various aspects of the
problem, but partnerships need to be forged between the initiatives’
[66].49
There is, however, a recognisable ‘third’ group of actors, namely,
the actors within the fishing communities who directly or indirectly aid
the organised criminals by engaging in ‘criminal livelihoods’ and are
driven to do so in the absence of alternative livelihoods by the need to
sustain themselves and their families.50 These actors defy easy classi-
fication in that they fall neatly into neither of the two groups identified
by Hauck and Sweijd. In fact, they are a theoretical source of in-
formation on organised criminals but, due to fear and/or financial need,
they may not be willing to provide such information. The appropriate
law enforcement approach is thus perhaps not as clear-cut as initially
envisaged.
Authors such as Ostrom [67], Agrawal [68], Wilson [69] and Jentoft
[22] stress the importance of the fact that self-governance at local
community level must translate into the ability to exclude others, create
entitlements, monitor the resources as well as structure participation
and decision-making. When one is dealing with high-value species, such
as abalone and West Coast rock lobster, it is arguably vital that the
community structures concerned are able to differentiate between
forms of illegal fishing that should be dealt with as a purely manage-
ment problem and forms of illegal fishing that are inherently an orga-
nised crime matter. The difficulty of implementing this in practice,
however, has already been highlighted above.
The wisdom of this analysis is arguably equally applicable by ana-
logy to illegal fishing in other small-scale fisheries and, more broadly,
to the management of the SSF sector as a whole, when one attempts to
minimise illegal fishing and, most importantly, weed out organised
criminal elements present within the sector. The two-pronged approach
outlined above provides a potentially useful lens as a starting point
through which to understand the role and use of extending the fisheries
crime paradigm to addressing illegal harvesting in the SSF sector. From
within this framework, the fisheries crime approach can be viewed as
one side of the duel-sided toolbox from which law enforcement agents
can draw means to address illegal fishing in this sector (the other side
being an administrative law approach). Specifically, this component
includes criminal-law and criminal-procedure tools which facilitate
investigations as well as intelligence gathering and sharing aimed at
identifying and removing the organised criminal elements involved in
illegal fishing and infiltrating broader community poaching activities.
The resulting focus on the criminal ‘middlemen’ — local criminal ele-
ments facilitating links between broader organised criminal networks
and local poachers — and those higher up the fisheries crime spectrum
facilitates a more efficient use of human, monetary and institutional
resources by ‘freeing up’ law enforcement officers and agencies to
channel their effort towards identifying the ‘head’ of the snake rather
than wasting time pursuing the ‘foot soldiers’.
The fisheries crime approach must run parallel to, and be co-
ordinated with, efforts to address low-key local poaching posited within
a broader, human rights-based discourse. In line with the tenet of the
SSFP, management of this sector must be guided by the human rights
needs of the small-scale fishers themselves and the other members of
the fishing communities, in particular the right to food security and to
secure livelihoods. The first step, facilitated by the SSFP, must be to
secure legal access rights of small-scale fishers. This is in line with in-
ternational sentiments reflected in policies such as the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement [70] and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries [71]. The manner in which South Africa has elected to secure
such access is via community-based rights, with users participating in
the management of allocated resources by local co-management struc-
tures nested within a multi-tiered institutional system [1]. The strong
community-based emphasis in the policy aims to promote capacity
development and the empowerment of fishers and fishing communities,
thereby facilitating local socio-economic development and the pro-
gressive realisation of their human rights [42]. Co-management pre-
supposes that fishing communities have the capacity to organise
themselves to such an extent that they can efficiently play a core
management role. Importantly, it also appears to assume that these
communities are sufficiently cohesive and homogenous in their desire
and ability to manage illegal fishing, particularly when it involves or-
ganised crime. This assumption that communities will be able to, or
even want to, play this gate-keeping role is arguably questionable, as
highlighted earlier in this essay. Indeed, it is recognised that fisheries
co-management arrangements to date have primarily focused on con-
servation and management goals, to the exclusion of broader socio-
economic goals such as poverty-alleviation. [72] Those arrangements
may, arguably, be ill-equipped to address issues such as illegal fishing, a
gap which it might be possible to fill by means of a fisheries crime law
enforcement approach.
Yet, the type of co-management approach that the SSFP adopts fo-
cuses on the conservation of marine resources by granting small-scale
fishers an active role in monitoring and surveillance. It thus does not
reflect self-governance management systems that grant fishers actual
decision-making powers to exclude others, allocate rights and decide
the nature and type of management structure which suits them. Rather,
the envisaged management approach under the SSFP is, in essence, top-
down, with the local community committees merely part of a re-
presentative democracy where the actual power to exclude others (i.e.
illegal harvesters) or identify illegal fishers as a criminal problem, is not
in fact given to them. In reality, this may well mean that the criminal
elements will continue to plague the communities. To the extent that, in
practice, communities will separate fisheries management issues from
the criminal aspects of illegal fishing (in particular in relation to high-
value small-scale resources), due to the lack of real decision-making
powers granted to them, their efforts will have little real effect on
curbing the tentacles of organised crime operating within the SSF
sector. Information gleaned from affected communities indicates fur-
ther that the levels of corruption of law enforcement officers and the
relationship between those law enforcement officers and local gangs or
drug dealers constitute a major stumbling block to dealing with the
problem. The consequence could thus be that the communities become
despondent with the system and, in some cases, resort to (continued)
illegal harvesting and trade.
Furthermore, it is unclear in practice how law enforcement and
management will interact in the ‘grey’ area where individuals within
48 Criticism of co-management within a coastal fisheries context has been well
documented in the literature; it is however beyond the scope of focus of our
article to go into these criticisms.
49 At 1030, 1031.
50 Isaacs is working with the community of Buffelsjags Bay using action re-
search methodology to gain the trust of the women, run workshops on what the
current issues facing the community are, and create a path to self-organisation
and is conducting in-depth one-on-on interviews with the women on criminal
livelihoods. As a PescaDOLUS project, Isaacs and Witbooi worked with a film
maker to document the women's testimonies on criminal livelihoods for visual
research; Isaacs and Witbooi will subsequently write-up and contextualise the
complexities of criminal livelihoods linked to abalone poaching in this mar-
ginalised community.
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communities assist organised criminal actors when driven by the ne-
cessity of realising their own basic human rights, such as the right of
access to food, in the face of the State's failure to proactively facilitate
the realisation of such rights. It must be conceded that the fisheries
crime paradigm proffers no clear-cut template from a law enforcement
approach in this situation and the SSFP, as highlighted above, provides
no indication of having foreseen such a scenario.
8. Conclusion
When it comes to the fit of the fisheries-crime paradigm with a
human rights-based approach to small-scale fisheries management, it is
arguably indeed a case of ‘bigger fish to fry’, at least theoretically. A
two-pronged approach to addressing illegal fishing in small-scale fish-
eries seems to offer the most appropriate solution towards this goal.
One aspect, employing a fisheries crime lens, entails law enforcement
responses (such as intelligence-gathering, policing, border control and
the identification of money-laundering trails) that focus on organised
criminal networks involved in illegal fishing that affects, inter alia, local
fishing communities. The second facet, running parallel, focuses on
empowering the fishing communities via the co-management of re-
sources, improved local socio-economic conditions and, together with
government, the progressive realisation of the human rights of the
members of those communities. In this sense, the fisheries crime
paradigm complements this latter track in that it ‘opens up’ space for
the government and locals to focus on strengthening the vital com-
munity-based element currently lacking in managing the SSF sector. It
does so by channelling law enforcement energy towards ‘higher’ orga-
nised criminals involved in illegal fishing, as opposed to locals, in
contrast to the confrontational crime-control methods used at ground
level in the past. This should ideally create room for the organic
strengthening and empowerment of the fishing communities, including
through economic development and poverty-alleviation mechanisms. It
could also alleviate the strain faced by communities, in their envisaged
role as co-managers of fisheries resources, when trying to find ways of
coping with the criminal elements infiltrating low-level poaching ac-
tivities. A focus by criminal law enforcement officers on the ‘bigger
fish’, as encouraged by the fisheries crime paradigm, could in this way
contribute in due course to the government fulfilling its duty to protect
and realise the right to food of the individuals involved in the SSF
sector. In fact, given the reality of the complex interface between or-
ganised criminal activities in the sector and ‘ordinary’ community
members facilitating these activities,51 a fisheries crime approach may
be both theoretically and practically the best framework option within
which to craft an appropriate law enforcement response.
Ultimately, it remains up to the government to turn the current
policy tide and implement the SSFP in a manner that grasps this op-
portunity. It can do so by instituting a community management system
that is conducive to such an approach and granting the communities the
prerequisite decision-making powers. It is an opportunity that the
government can surely not afford to miss if it is serious about fighting
fisheries crime.
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